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The pendulum of administrative law, marking successive
phases of regulation's expansion and its contraction, swings once
again in the direction of reform. The rhetoric of deregulation per-
vades agency pronouncements.1 Editorials denounce delays in
achieving regulatory reform.2 Bills contemplating less regulation,
the reform of the regulatory process, or more legislative and judi-
cial oversight, work their way through Congress.' Here and there,
some reduction in regulation has actually occurred.4
This alternation of regulation and reform is not the result of
some mysterious dialectic but reflects the common experience of
trial and error. Regulation expands to meet felt needs in an ever
more complex and changing society. The momentum carries the
process too far. Regulation fails to produce the desired outcome,
inflicts unexpected costs, or causes actual harm. Then, after a sur-
feit of regulation, disillusion and a desire for reform ensue.
The recurring waves of regulation began before the turn of the
t Member, District of Columbia Bar; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School (1982-
1983).
1 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified, 84 F.C.C.2d 50
(1980), modified further, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), petitions for review filed sub nom. Com-
puter & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, No. 80-1471 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1980).
" E.g., For Oil, Magic; for Gas. . . , N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at A30, col. 1.
" E.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982)
(The Regulatory Reform Act); H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Regulatory Procedure Act of
1982), reprinted as amended in H.R. REP. No. 435, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1982).
4 See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 45 & 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. IV 1980) and in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
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century. In 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act,5 the archetype of
regulatory statutes, addressed the monopoly power of the rail-
roads, which then were the dominant means of transportation; in
1890 the Sherman Act6 outlawed trusts, monopolies, and conspira-
cies in restraint of trade. The next wave of regulation, in the Wil-
son era, produced among other regulatory schemes the Federal Re-
serve System 7 the Federal Trade Commission," the Clayton Act,9
and the Packers and Stockyards Act.10 In the 1930's came a torrent
of new agencies," followed in turn by amendments of the original
legislation, issuance of numerous regulations, and vast enlargement
of the Washington bar.
Although regulation seems almost synonymous with the New
Deal, Judge Breyer asserts in Regulation and Its Reform that
"most of this growth [in the regulation of the American economy]
has taken place since the mid-1960's. ' ' 12 Until well after World
War II, general economic regulation was a rarity, directed prima-
rily at communications, transportation, and public utilities. More
limited controls governed a few other sensitive areas, such as food,
drugs, and banking. Then, beginning in the mid-1960's, "[t]he fed-
eral government began to regulate oil prices and other aspects of
energy production; to impose significant controls upon environ-
mental pollution; and to regulate the safety of the workplace, of
the highway, and of consumer products. It increased regulatory
protection of investors, including pension holders and commodities
traders. ' '18 Noneconomic regulation grew apace, and Ralph Nader,
pictured on the cover of news magazines, became a symbol for a
5 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (Supp.
IV 1980)).
6 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976)).
7 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
409 (1976) and in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
3 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. IV (1980)).
* Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-19, 20, 21,
22-27, 44 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1976)).
10 Ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-183, 191-195, 201-
203, 205-218d, 221-229 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
11 These include, among others, the NLRB, see National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)),
and the FCC, see Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976) and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
2 S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982).
3 Id.
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new wave of regulation.
Some of Breyer's figures measure the recent expansion. During
the 1970's, the number of pages of regulations in the Federal Reg-
ister tripled, federal regulatory budgets expanded six times over,
and full-time positions in regulatory agencies more than tripled.1 4
It is estimated that in 1965 regulated industries produced 8.2% of
the gross national product; by 1975 the corresponding figure was
23.7% .15 The costs of regulation, including costs of compliance, are
computed in the billions of dollars.16
Intervening between periods of growth have been occasions of
somnolence, such as the Eisenhower era, marked by few new stat-
utes and often by reduced enforcement. At other times, Congress
has sought to improve or reform regulation-the Administrative
Procedure Act of 194617 is an example-or to prune its luxuriance.
These reforming trends and theories, however, had a narrow focus:
the critics accepted the fundamental premises of the regulatory re-
gime and sought only to clarify the legislation and regulations or to
reduce misfeasance and corruption.18 Today, many reformers
doubt whether regulation is required at all in certain areas, and in
areas where a need for regulation is conceded they favor less re-
strictive alternatives.
Many sources feed this new tide of reform. Analyses, often as-
sociated with the "Chicago School," challenge much regulation as
unjustified by economic theory.19 Dismay at the practical impact of
economic regulation, notably in the energy area, has been matched
by a few happy results from deregulation.20 The competitive weak-
14 Id.
"s P. MAcAvoY, THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THE ECONOMY 25 (1979). See also S.
BREYER, supra note 12, at 1.
11 S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 2.
. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706,
and in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1976, Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980)).
18 E.g., H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER
DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).
19 For example, see the path-breaking paper written by Professor George Stigler of The
University of Chicago. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sol. 3 (1971). For other such studies, see Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1972); Kitch,
Isaacson & Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J.L. & EcON. 285 (1971);
Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amend-
ments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 335 (1974); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The
Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962).
20 See, e.g., Stelzer, Electric Utilities-Next Stop for Deregulators?, REG., July-Aug.
1982, at 29, 29-30 (noting that the claimed success of airline deregulation is one motivation
for deregulation of electric utilities).
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ness of the American economy in international trade and the grow-
ing success of the Japanese have prompted a search for culprits,
among them excessive regulation. The uniquely American distaste
for government, combined with an abiding resentment of red tape,
taxes, and the insolence of power, also spurs the movement toward
deregulation.
Despite its breadth and force, the recent interest in reform
and deregulation has sparked few academic overviews, and under-
standably so. An effective critic must be familiar with a wide range
of regulatory regimes and industries, combine legal with economic
analysis, and derive conclusions that transcend the particular pro-
gram or agency. The shortage of broad-gauged criticism makes
Breyer's book an especially welcome addition to the literature of
administrative reform. He combines his ample knowledge of ad-
ministrative law with a solid grounding in economics to develop animaginative analytical framework for evaluating and reforming
America's regulatory establishment.
I
Breyer held several importarit posts before his appointment to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, including
that of special counsel to a United States Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee chaired by Senator Kennedy. There he was intimately
and influentially concerned with the legislation that led to airline
deregulation and the coming demise of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. His present work was partly inspired by and is in part an
extrapolation from that endeavor.21
After describing the explosion of new regulation and the grow-
ing criticism of it, Breyer sets two objectives for his book: (1) to
categorize regulatory plans and describe their strengths and weak-
nesses, and (2) to derive rules identifying areas for regulatory re-
form and to suggest tentative solutions.22 Part I of the book first
arrays the familiar justifications for regulation. It considers the
control of monopoly power, 3 the problem of windfall profits, 4 the
need to compensate for "spillovers" (externalities whose costs are
not reflected in market prices), 3 the absence of the information
21 S. BREYER, supra note 12, at vii-viii.
2 Id. at 4-5.
23 Id. at 15-20.
24 Id. at 21-23.
2 Id. at 23-26.
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needed for an unregulated market to function properly,2 6 and the
claim that regulation is needed to avoid "excessive competition."27
A group of other, less commonly used rationales, including "ration-
alization," "moral hazard," and "paternalism," are considered
more briefly.28
Part I then examines in detail six conventional modes of regu-
lation 29 and, more quickly, seven "alternatives to classical regula-
tion," each of which, except one, is a "less restrictive alternative."30
Breyer describes the workings of each traditional mode and scruti-
nizes its strengths and weaknesses. For example, he considers the
case of historically based price controls, which establish as the
maximum permissible prices of goods their highest prices during a
certain historical period. This form of regulation is typically justi-
fied as simple, effective, and efficient. Breyer relates how this claim
inevitably is proven false. In each instance in which price controls
have been instituted (World War II, the Korean War, and the
early 1970's), some prices (the costs of imports, for example) re-
mained uncontrolled and continued to rise. To operate fairly, the
system had to allow cost pass-throughs for at least those costs. In-
stead of setting simple, fixed prices, the regulations became com-
plex. In the end, neither simplicity nor effective control was
achieved.3'
In the final chapter of Part I, Breyer derives four rather mod-
est "rules of thumb" from his survey: (1) the need for regulation
should be clearly proven, because regulation introduces its own
distortions; (2) regulators should use simple solutions aimed at
"worst cases," because the cost of curing every minor defect is too
high; (3) even if the need for some kind of intervention is proven,
classical regulation should be "a weapon of last resort" after "less
26 Id. at 26-28.
" Id. at 29-32.
28 Id. at 32-34. "Rationalization" justifies regulation on the ground that, without it, an
industry would remain too fragmented to operate most efficiently. "Moral hazard" means
that someone other than the buyer is paying for the buyer's purchase (e.g., certain medical
insurance arrangements) so that marketplace constraints may not operate effectively. "Pa-
ternalism" relies upon the public's lack of expertise or upon various irrational impulses of
consumers to justify government regulation. Id.
" The traditional methods are cost of service ratemaking, id. at 36-59; historically
based price regulation, id. at 60-70; allocation under a public interest standard, id. at 71-95;
standard setting, id. at 96-119; historically based allocation, id. at 120-30; and individualized
screening, id. at 131-55.
SO The alternatives are antitrust, id. at 156-61; disclosure requirements, id. at 161-64;
taxes, id. at 164-71; marketable property rights, id. at 171-74; changes in tort liability, id. at
174-77; bargaining, id. at 177-81; and nationalization, id. at 181-83.
31 Id. at 61-63.
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restrictive alternatives" have been proven wanting; and (4) accu-
rate knowledge of the defects of a particular type of regulation
may well guide the legislator toward a different mode. 2
In Part II of the book, Breyer develops the central thesis: fail-
ures of classical regulation often are due not to collateral weak-
nesses, such as a poor agency staff, political influence, or inferior
procedures, but to a fundamental "mismatch" of the regulatory
tool and the particular evil.33 Breyer posits three "maxims" to
identify areas where mismatches are probable, although not
certain:
Classical regulation should not be used to control exces-
sive competition. Deregulation and reliance upon antitrust are
more suitable....
Classical regulation should ordinarily not be used for pur-
poses of [economic] rent control. Taxes or deregulation offer
preferable alternatives....
Classical regulation is not able to deal comprehensively
with spillover problems. Taxes, marketable rights, and even
bargaining are likely to prove useful as substitutes or
supplements."4
Breyer illustrates each of the maxims with examples occupying one
or more chapters: he illustrates the first with airline 5 and truck-
ings regulation; the second with natural gas regulation;37 and the
third with pollution control programs.3 s Not surprisingly, the ex-
amples bear out the maxims.
Part III of the book discusses the practical problems of statu-
tory reform. The first chapter 9  describes the mechan-
ics-planning, information gathering, hearings, political interplay
of conflicting forces-of the enactment of the Airline Deregulation
3" Id. at 184-88. These are described as "rules of thumb" in an earlier work in which
Breyer had a hand. See COMMISSION ON LAW & THE ECONOMY, ABA, FEDERAL REGULATION:
ROADS TO REFORM 51 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RoADs TO REFORM]; see also id. at 24-67.
33E.g., S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 191. Thus, in a "tentative match" table, he pairs
regulatory problems with presumptive solutions: natural monopoly is matched with cost-of-
service ratemaking or nationalization; control of economic rent is matched with taxes or
deregulation; spillovers are matched with marketable rights or bargaining; excessive compe-
tition is matched with a mix of deregulation and antitrust; and inadequate information is
matched with a set of alternatives including disclosure. Id. at 191.
" Id. at 195 (emphasis omitted).
35 Id. at 197-221.
3' Id. at 222-39.
37 Id. at 240-60.
" Id. at 261-84.
3" Id. at 317-40.
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Act of 1978.40 In the second chapter,4' Breyer first classifies and
largely discounts a number of "generic" regulatory re-
forms-reforms that do not address the substantive aspects of any
particular program but instead attempt to reform the general ad-
ministrative process.42 Breyer then focuses on two proposals that
he finds particularly promising. The first, embodied in a bill pro-
posed by Senator Kennedy in 1979,41 calls for a "competitive im-
pact statement," akin to the environmental impact statement now
required, for all major federal regulatory action.44 The second pro-
posal, which Breyer finds more appealing, is compulsory "high
noon" review of existing regulatory programs to see how they
might be restructured where mismatches exist, a concept also in-
cluded in Senator Kennedy's 1979 bill.45
II
One major theme of Breyer's book is that, where regulation is
concerned, less is presumptively better. One of his four rules of
thumb is a presumption against regulation and another presumes
that, if regulation is to be used, it should be the least stringent
alternative. All three of his maxims argue for deregulation or less
severe types of regulation. Both of his legislative remedies-the
competitive impact statement and the "high noon" reexamination
of statutes-aim to reduce regulation. Taken together, they suggest
a central question: how can one prove or disprove Breyer's rules
and presumptions?
Unfortunately, there are serious flaws in all of the methods
available to prove Breyer's thesis. The most "scientific" method
would be to quantify costs and benefits and to measure the net
gain or loss from imposing each of the regulatory solutions. This
method, however, is often impractical. Indeed, even to isolate costs
40 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV 1980)).
"' S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 341-68.
42 These approaches include reforms such as improved personnel, internal procedural
changes, greater representation of public interest spokesmen, more legislative or presidential
control, and new institutions (e.g., ombudsmen or a consumer protection agency). Id. at 342-
63.
" S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1979).
44 This proposal would require an agency, before taking action that would lessen com-
petition substantially, to show that its measure, rather than a less restrictive alternative, is
necessary to meet the statutory objectives. Breyer admits that it "risks creating a significant
amount of additional bureaucratic paperwork and consultant studies with only a small
change in substantive results." S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 365.
'1 S. 1291, supra note 43, § 301; see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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and benefits is likely to be difficult: the number of variables may
be immense;"' the causal relationships are often obscure; and some
values are difficult to quantify.47 Even if one could show that a
particular regulatory mode-or no regulation at all-produced the
greatest net benefit in one case, the same conclusion might not
hold for a similar regulatory problem on somewhat different
facts.'
An alternative approach is to extrapolate from experience.
Airline deregulation is an example of this approach because it was
inspired in considerable measure by experience in California and
Texas, where unregulated intrastate fares were lower than fares for
comparable interstate distances.' Similarly, one can inquire what
the experience has been in other countries.50 A state or foreign
market, however, may differ from the United States market in
ways that defeat such comparisons. Even where a federal regula-
tory statute is amended to alter the regulatory mode, the evidence
after the change is often ambiguous, 51 and new events intervene.52
4' For example, suppose one were measuring the costs and benefits of deregulating mo-
tor carriers: one would have to project possible reductions in service to certain communities
and evaluate the direct and indirect economic impact; estimate the extent to which competi-
tion would lower rates on certain routes and raise them on others; estimate the economic
effects of those steps; compute economic loss from certain restrictive operating practices
induced by regulation; measure the cost of regulation itself; and account for possible in-
creased capital costs inherent in a more competitive environment.
47 In its cost-benefit analysis provisions, S. 1080 recognizes the significance of "non-
quantifiable" costs and benefits. See S. 1080, supra note 3, § 4(a), 128 CONG. REc. at S2715
(proposing new 5 U.S.C. § 622(e)(1)).
4' See, e.g., Stelzer, supra note 20, at 29-30 (although "airline deregulation has been
fabulously successful," id. at 29, airline experience is not a proper model for deregulating
electric power distribution because electricity distribution, unlike air transport, is a natural
monopoly).
4 See S. BRBYER, supra note 12, at 201-05.
50 For example, economists are now comparing domestic and Canadian experience with
railroads. See, e.g., Caves, Christensen & Swanson, The High Cost of Regulating U.S. Rail-
roads, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 41. Canadian railroads are subject to far less regulation than
are United States railroads. Caves and his colleagues concluded from comparing the two
that the annual direct and indirect costs of U.S. regulation exceeded six billion dollars. Id.
at 41-42. See also Caves, Christensen & Swanson, Productivity in U.S. Railroads, 1951-
1974, 11 BELL J. ECON. 166 (1980).
51 See, e.g., Mabley & Strack, Deregulation-A Green Light for Trucking Efficiency,
REG., July-Aug. 1982, at 36 (more time needed for adequate assessment of past five years'
trucking regulation reform); Ellis, U.S. Airline Competition: The Sifting Has Begun, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, May 17, 1982, at 1 (airline deregulation probably beneficial in long-term,
but airlines troubled by it in short-term).
11 In the case of the troubled airline industry, substantial increases in oil prices over the
past decade have strained many airlines, as has the worldwide recession, which affects air
travel for all airlines, including the best managed. See Meyer & Oster, Introduction, in Am-
LINE DEREGULATION 4 (J. Meyer & C. Oster eds. 1981) (recession and rising fuel costs have
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Moreover, the time horizon over which changes must be judged is
often quite long.53 Thus, even where it is possible to put deregula-
tion to the test of actual experience, the lesson may be less than
clear.
Perhaps the best basis for a presumption against regulation,
therefore, is not a proof at all, but a pragmatic insight. Once im-
posed, regulation almost always will be very difficult to dislodge,
even if it proves mistaken. Almost any regulatory regime will de-
velop a constituency, armed with congressmen and self-interested
bureaucrats. 4 Moreover, almost any regulatory program, whether
well conceived or not, becomes the foundation on which private
arrangements are constructed, arrangements that cannot easily be
discarded.55
Given this reality, Breyer's presumption is more appropriate
when framing a new regulatory program than when appraising one
that already exists. Whatever the mismatch theory might say, one
ought to hesitate to change an existing program that seems to
work, regardless of the solution that theory may prefer. The best
argument for leaving the telephone system alone was that it ap-
peared to be providing very good service, and the best argument
for railroad reform legislation was the number of railroads in bank-
ruptcy. Similarly, the best argument against imposing any regula-
tion or in favor of choosing less restrictive alternatives may well be
that it is difficult to choose a good regulatory scheme, and that it is
harder still to eliminate even a bad one. Whether evaluating the
need for regulation or the need for reform, the right rule of thumb
made the airline industry less profitable since deregulation); Ellis, supra note 51, passim
(higher fuel prices, recession, and PATCO strike combined with deregulation to bankrupt
Braniff Airlines).
63 See, e.g., Mabley & Strack, supra note 51, at 56 (concluding "[i]t will be several years
before we can make a complete assessment of the long- and even short-term effects of [the]
trucking regulation reform" of the previous five years).
See, e.g., Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-the "Issue-Attention Cycle," PUB.
INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 38, 41.
15 A classic example is the medallions issued for taxicabs in New York City, each of
which now represents an investment of thousands of dollars. It is all very well to say that
the taxi industry is not a natural monopoly and should not be subject to entry regulation,
even if rate regulation is utilized for other reasons. Nevertheless, there may be some equity,
as well as political muscle, in a claim that a new policy of open entry, introduced without
any warning or recompense, would unfairly injure many individuals whose entire capital
may be represented by such medallions. See New York City Looks at Taxi Regulation,
REG., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 11, 11-13, 36 (describing the problem of taxi medallions and dis-
cussing possible solutions); see also Kitch, Isaacson & Kasper, supra note 19, passim (dis-
cussing entry barriers and their effect).
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might be, if it isn't badly broken, don't try to fix it.56
III
Throughout the book, Breyer asserts that fear of predatory
pricing is no justification for classical regulation and that it is more
suitable to rely on the antitrust laws.5 7 His emphasis on the anti-
trust alternative raises the question how well antitrust strictures
can function in industries, such as trucking, banking, railroads, and
airlines, that have been or are most likely to be deregulated in ac-
cordance with Breyer's maxims.
Regulation has long been seen as a substitute for policing in-
dustries through antitrust laws. Thus, either by statute or by judi-
cial action, 58 regulated industries often have enjoyed substantial
immunity from antitrust laws. 9 In recent years, regulation has
been thought to justify a smaller degree of antitrust immunity,60
and when an industry is wholly or partially deregulated, its anti-
trust immunity is likely to contract further or to vanish altogether.
Existing antitrust doctrine, however, is not always well suited
to industries that have evolved under classical regulation. Not his-
tory alone, but permanent characteristics of such industries, pro-
duce the clash. For example, although it is true that railroads no
"' Admittedly, whether a regime is worth preserving depends on the alternatives availa-
ble. Breyer might reasonably argue that although an existing regime of regulated airlines or
regulated trucks may seem to be providing adequate service, unnecessary costs are buried in
such regulation and deregulation would improve service and reduce rates. No one can brush
this objection aside. On the other hand, there are so many things in the regulatory world
and society at large that do not work well even on the surface that it is at least arguable that
those that do seem to work ought to be low on the list for reform.
" See, e.g., S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 30-32, 195. Breyer also questions the other
rationales sometimes clustered under the same "excessive competition" heading. He criti-
cizes, for example, arguments for regulation based on "the cyclical nature of demand,"
where an industry asks for protection against competition on the ground that necessarily
large fixed investments, comparatively small variable costs, and substantial swings in de-
mand will produce a succession of shortages and bankruptcies. Id. at 31.
6S See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 221 (1978). For discussion of immu-
nity for specific industries, see id. at V 228 (agricultural and fishermen's cooperatives), 229
(labor unions), I 230(a) (export associations), I 230(b) (national defense), I 230(c) (small
business), 230(d) (newspapers), I 230(e) (banks), I 230(f) (professional sports).
5' Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (no immu-
nity) with United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 721-22 (1975) (im-
munity) and Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 300-02 (1973) (regulatory
agency has primary jurisdiction to make determinations under its authority prior to judicial
hearing on civil antitrust claims).
" See, e.g., National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981) (an-
titrust immunity to be implied only when necessary to make regulatory scheme work and
then only to the minimum extent necessary).
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longer have a monopoly of the freight business and arguably ought
to be deregulated, most of the rail freight in the United States is
interchanged between railroads. The railroads therefore are joint
venturers as well as competitors; such carriers must engage in ex-
tensive cooperative arrangements for freight cars to travel from
one end of the country to the other over a complex series of
routes."1 If one were to apply the pure antitrust doctrines devel-
oped for highly competitive industries in the face of the need for
cooperation in 'railroading, it could produce very strange results
indeed. 2
The problem of unsatisfactory doctrine is by no means con-
fined to regulated industries,63 but as deregulation progresses, for-
merly regulated industries do pose a special problem with which
antitrust law has scarcely begun to cope. Antitrust doctrine must
adapt-to industries, such as the railroads, that are only partly com-
petitive. With some imagination, courts can probably adjust ex-
" The number of specifics requiring some type of agreement and coordination among
these "competitors" to make such a system function is apparent with a little thought: bills
of lading; repair of freight cars; arrangements on billing, credit, and collection for through
movements; damage responsibilities; technical specifications for equipment; restrictions on
hazardous materials and adjunct safety precautions; and dozens of other matters have to be
the subject of some type of regulation, agreement, or both to make the intercarrier system
function.
62 This is no less true of many other such necessarily cooperative industries. For exam-
ple, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam), a
gas sellers' association denied approval of the Radiant Burner, and the members of the asso-
ciation refused to sell gas to any customer who planned to use the burner, alleging that it
was unsafe; the burner's manufacturer claimed that approval was denied to serve anticom-
petitive purposes. The Court held that the manufacturer stated a cause of action under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), because the association's activity fell
"within one of the 'classes of restraints which from their "nature or character" [are] unduly
restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute."' Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc., 364 U.S. at 659-60 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 211 (1959) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911))). If this
language were applied literally to the product approval procedures in which interconnected
pipeline companies or electric power companies engage to protect workers and the public,
such minimal and reasonable safety precautions might be held to be group boycotts in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.
63 For example, there is still substantial disagreement on what constitutes below-cost or
predatory pricing even in highly competitive, never-regulated industries. See Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 263, 263-64 (1981). Like-
wise, new business arrangements in competitive industries require an adaptation of antitrust
precedent, as is illustrated by the evolving antitrust law concerning franchising. See, e.g.,
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980) (franchisor's requirements
that franchisee operate franchise in premises leased from franchisor and deposit $15,000 as
security do not constitute illegal tying arrangements, where franchise is more than mere




isting antitrust doctrine to retain cooperative arrangements that
are important to the efficient development of an industry.6
In other situations, some type of explicit legislative antitrust
immunity will remain necessary to capture certain efficiencies,
even in an industry deregulated in many respects. For example,
railroads and consumers would sacrifice millions of dollars in sav-
ings if all railroad mergers were subject to section 7 of the Clayton
Act 65 rather than the public interest standard of the Interstate
Commerce Act, which grants explicit antitrust immunity for ap-
proved mergers.66
What reformers should work towards is a kind of "mixed econ-
omy" in the regulation of such industries, relying for the most part
on a sophisticated development of antitrust law, but falling back
on statutory regulation and immunity in some areas. 7 In fairness
to Breyer, it should be noted that he concedes that his "alterna-
tives" to classical regulation (such as antitrust) may prove more
useful as supplements to continued regulation than as complete
substitutes.6 " In looking to the future, one suspects that developing
a more sophisticated antitrust regime for the industries Breyer
44 An example of fruitful flexibility is Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d
1156, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding congressional mandate that FERC encourage coopera-
tion among power districts, and holding that price-fixing arrangement "reasonably necessary
to the functioning of the cooperative arrangement" does not violate antitrust laws). See
United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1360-61 (D.D.C. 1981) (in assessing interconnec-
tion of AT&T facilities with non-AT&T carriers, "problems of feasibility and practicability
... [to] be taken into account"); see also Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (2d
Cir. 1975) (rules providing per se antitrust violation inapplicable to stock exchanges), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, 1 223(d) ("legality
of a challenged practice under the antitrust laws will often depend upon a court's judgment
of the degree of social harm that might result from the challenged practice, the social bene-
fits that might be obtained through that practice, and the availability of significantly less
restrictive alternatives").
" Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (forbidding corporate acquisitions where "the
effect. . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
46 49 U.S.C. §§ 11341-11351 (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring ICC to approve common carrier
mergers and acquisitions upon finding merger "consistent with the public interest," and
explicitly exempting such transactions from antitrust laws).
It is clear that in some cases cooperative activities may produce the most efficient mar-
ket structure. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONoMIc NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 393-95 (2d ed. 1981) ("per se rule against mergers and other methods of
fusion of competitors would . . . catch within its net . . . transactions that had a positive
effect on efficiency," id. at 393); see also Bradley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95
HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1525, 1527-29 (1982) (joint ventures produce economic efficiencies that
justify special treatment under antitrust laws).
17 In the railroad industry, for example, pooling arrangements and divisions of collec-
tive earnings may remain vital features even after deregulation.
" See S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 156.
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proposes to deregulate will be scarcely less important than the de-
regulation itself.
IV
Of all the proposals for "generic" reform, the "high noon" de-
vice for reviewing existing statutes is Breyer's favorite. Breyer is
doubtful about almost all of the others.6 9 Most of these proposals
have been around for a long time, 0 and Breyer discounts some of
them with a bit of mild mockery. 1 The high noon device is also
unlikely to be very effective.
The high noon concept has initial appeal precisely because it
would compel Congress to deal with basics, to address the substan-
tive plan of regulation rather than tinker with its mechanism. For
example, Senator Kennedy's high noon proposal 2 contemplated
presidential commissions to study regulatory programs under a
prescribed schedule and to propose reform legislation to Congress.
Congress would have to vote on either the proposed bill or its own
bill; in either case it would be sure to address some substantive
reform proposal.7 3 The version of high noon that Senator Ken-
nedy's bill proposed also had a decided bias toward efforts to in-
crease economic competition and "[a]chieve the statutory goals of
the agency by less restrictive or nonregulatory means, including,
but not limited to, the use of taxes, penalties, market-based incen-
tives, bargaining techniques, required disclosure, or the creation of
new causes of action. '7 4
69 See id. at 341-68.
70 Id. at 354-55. Breyer notes that the independent agencies have been criticized at
least since the 1930's as management failures. Id. at 354. "'Their mechanism is inevitably
slow, cumbersome, wasteful, and ineffective, and does not lend itself readily to cooperation
with other agencies.'" Id. (quoting THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMrrran ON ADMINISTRATIVE MAN-
AGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 32 (1937)). Such conclusions were reiterated in the
reports of the first and second Hoover Commissions, the Landis investigation, and the Ashe
Council. See id. at 355.
71 He quotes with deserved irony the Senate Commerce Committee complaint that
many appointments to the FTC and FCC "'can be explained in terms of powerful political
connections and little else."' Id. at 342 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, The
Regulatory Appointments Process, in 1 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 25,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 7 (1977) (citing an earlier report to the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee)). Commenting on the suggestion that higher standards be applied in the appointments
process, Breyer observes "[ihose [standards] suggested tend to be embarrassingly general,
such as the suggestion by the [Senate] Governmental Affairs Committee that 'by reason of
background, training or experience, the nominee' be 'affirmatively qualified for the office to
which he or she is nominated.'" Id. at 343 (quoting unspecified source).
72 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73 S. BREVER, supra note 12, at 366-68.
74 S. 1291, supra note 43, § 301(a).
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Breyer himself is skeptical about the prospect of major regula-
tory reform7 5 and his skepticism is well warranted.7 6 The inertial
resistance of an existing program or regime is legendary, and Con-
gress, with its various mechanisms for delay, permits opposition
groups to resist changes for years." Airline deregulation-a signifi-
cant change accomplished in the absence of a real crisis-may be
something of a sport, owing more than a little to the cast of charac-
ters involved, including Breyer. Far more typical may be the pro-
posed criminal code reform 78 and the proposed telecommunications
legislation, 7 both of which now have languished through successive
Congresses.
Nevertheless, little would be lost by pursuing the Kennedy
high noon proposal. Indeed, its requirement that Congress conduct
hearings on and debate specific reform proposals"° would shine
publicity on some of the worst abuses and generate the kind of
editorial criticism and public attention that can eventually move
Congress to action. Furthermore, high noon's imposition of a
schedule for considering reform of particular areas of regulation
may overcome the inertia that today makes reform more difficult.
In any case, it is surely more promising than the sister provision in
the latest major reform bill in which the Senate proposes to re-
quire agencies to undertake such a systematic review of existing
major agency rules.8' But Congress is not inclined to burden itself
with the same periodic review obligations, and the Kennedy high
11 S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 368.
76 Even the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 45 & 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)), providing some deregulation of
the railroad industry, does so only to a limited degree and through compromise provisions of
such complexity that lawyers will be employed for years, if not decades, unraveling them.
77 For a discussion of this aspect of the legislative process, see Friendly, The Gap in
Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963),
reprinted in H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 41 (1967).
78 For a brief history of attempts to reform the criminal code, see Shattuck & Landau,
Civil Liberties and Criminal Code Reform, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 914, 916-22
(1981).
7 See Court's AT&T Ruling Refocuses Attention on New Legislation, 40 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1986, 1986 (1982) (telecommunications reform will be delayed until at least
1983 because Rep. Wirth has withdrawn his bill, accusing opponents of "delaying tactics");
36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 18-19 (1981) (noting that a "four-year effort to rewrite the 1934 Com-
munications Act was again unsuccessful in 1980"). For an example of proposed telecommu-
nications legislation, see H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1982 (pt. 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance, of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 5158,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-122 (1982).
o See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
s' See S. 1080, supra note 3, § 4, 128 CONG. REc. at S2716-17.
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noon proposal has not prospered.
Breyer may undervalue other means of improving agency
processes, especially those designed to make an agency act more
quickly, if not more rationally. Curiously, Breyer gives little atten-
tion to such deadline requirements, even though his own descrip-
tion of airline regulation dwells with outrage on the secret morato-
rium once imposed by the CAB on new competition. 2 An agency
device more typical than refusing to hold any hearings is to com-
mence proceedings but never decide issues, a process that some
agencies have reduced to a fine art through the folding of old un-
completed dockets into new ones.83 Ever willing to hold agencies to
higher standards than it imposes on itself, Congress has begun to
deal with such tactics"4 and the courts are learning to do so. s'
Although far less striking than major deregulation measures,
such time constraints can be very important. Competition, as
Breyer's CAB example illustrates, can be frustrated as much by
endless delays in agency action as by baseless policy decisions. The
costs of delay, in idle investment, litigation, and uncertainty, are
formidable. At the very least, time limitations on proceedings ad-
vance the day when a reviewing court can get its hands on the
82 S. BREYER, supra note 12, at 208.
83 See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 187-91, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court "sympa-
thetic" with characterization of FCC's 10-year machinations as "'interminable proceeding,
the principal function of which has been that of a giant regulatory wastebasket,'" id. at
206).
84 The Interstate Commerce Act is now littered with statutory deadlines, imposing me-
ticulous timetables on the agency. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10322(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (ICC must
make all initial decisions within 80 days (270 days when oral evidence is taken) in all mat-
ters unrelated to rail carriers), § 10322(e)(2) (if initial decision is appealed, final decision
must issue within 50 days), § 10322(i) (ICC in extraordinary circumstances may extend
these deadlines, but total of extensions cannot exceed 90 days), § 10326(a) (when petitioned
to make rail carrier rules, ICC must grant or deny petition within 50 days), § 10237(b) (in
rail carrier matters, all evidentiary proceedings to be completed within 120 days thereafter),
§ 10237(e) (Commission has 20 days to act on initial decision).
85 See, e.g., National Ass'n of Recycling Indus. v. ICC, 585 F.2d 522, 542-43 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (on reh'g) (per curiam) (two-year delay in ratemaking violates statutory requirement,
45 U.S.C. § 793 (1976), of "expedited proceedings"; ICC ordered to conduct investigation
within six months), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1978); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 15, 18
(1st Cir. 1978) (construing statutory requirements that agency proceed "within reasonable
time," 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976), and that court may compel agency action "unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed," id. § 706(1); ordering Social Security Administration to re-
duce administrative delays by providing disability claims hearings within 90 days); Nader v.
FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (construing 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (1976),
court finds 10-year delay in ratemaking dispute unreasonable and orders FCC to present
timetable for resolving dispute). See also 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.12,
at 53 (2d ed. 1980), arguing that practitioners should more frequently invoke the courts'
power under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976) to compel agency action unreasonably delayed.
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problem (and the agency). A prompt agency decision is also benefi-
cial because it is likely to bear a closer relation to the facts than is
one based on an ancient record.
The same concern that calls for imposition of time deadlines
should also encourage reforms that permit an agency to do its job
more swiftly and discourage those that raise new procedural hur-
dles for the agency to jump.86 Even a well-intended procedural
safeguard necessarily will import new delays and defeat prompt
agency action. Thus, reform proposals ought to be judged at least
in part by whether they expedite or retard agency proceedings.
Congress is considering a number of reform proposals that one
might scrutinize in this way. The version that has progressed the
farthest is S. 1080.17 Although the bill has too many provisions88
and too many implications to discuss adequately in a few pages, it
does teach several lessons about efficiency and the politics of ge-
neric reform.
The first lesson is that in the inevitable tension between
agency speed and procedural safeguards, Congress continues to
favor the latter at the expense of the former. Sometimes the
price-agency delay-is worth paying. It is probably wise, for ex-
ample, that S. 1080 insists on a defined record even for informal
rulemaking; 9 this not only aids judicial review but also permits lit-
igants to respond to the evidence upon which the agency has re-
lied. Similarly, the bill's requirements that the rulemaking agency
perform and publish a cost-benefit analysis for rules involving
more than $100 million in annual impact ° should help protect the
public from unduly inefficient regulation. Other provisions of S.
1080, however, simply create procedural hurdles without providing
any assurance that the outcomes will be any more sound. For ex-
ample, while evidentiary hearings are sometimes needed for sound
rulemaking, the bill's provision for cross-examination in major
88 A salutary development in recent years has been the agencies' own reduced use of
evidentiary hearings in favor of swifter methods, a process that can be carried too far, but
that is usually sound where policy issues are to be decided. See generally 3 K. DAvIs, supra
note 85, §§ 14.1-14.5.
" Supra note 3.
" The bill includes provisions concerning, inter alia, improved notices of rulemaking;
public hearings; cross-examination, a restricted record, and required record support in infor-
mal rulemakings; cost-benefit analysis and periodic reexamination of major rules; agency
deadlines; new standards for judicial review; and congressional veto of agency rules. See S.
1080, supra note 3, 128 CONG. REc. at S2713-21.
"8 See id. § 3, 128 CONG. REc. at S2714 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2)), § 4(a), 128
CONG. REC. at S2715 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. § 622(c)-(e)).
1* Id. § 4(a), 128 CONG. REC. at S2714-15 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. §§ 621-622).
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rulemakings9' is loosely phrased and promises trouble for agencies
seeking to bring their proceedings to a timely conclusion. Similarly,
a provision requiring republication of a proposed rule if the origi-
nal notice did not apprise the public of "the substance of the [fi-
nal] rule"92 invites useless delay, since one purpose of the rulemak-
ing procedure is to develop and consider modifications of the
proposed rule.
The second lesson for the reformer is that Congress continues
to be pointlessly mesmerized by standards of judicial review, even
though these standards do not matter very much in real cases.9 3 Of
course, a prohibition on review could be very significant, but such
provisions are rare. Delicate linguistic adjustments in standards
are not worth the time spent in debate, much less the countless
briefs and decisions that will be devoted to implementing them.
For example, much time was spent refining a requirement in
S. 1080 for an "independent" judicial appraisal in deciding legal
questions concerning "agency jurisdiction or authority."9 4 The bill
directs courts to stress statutory language rather than legislative
history or agency discretion.9 5 It is especially amusing that a cen-
tral concept in this provision-the term "authority"-is so ambig-
uous that it requires resort to the legislative history, and that his-
tory itself is unclear. This is not a propitious beginning for a
directive to the courts to rely primarily on statutory language.
A final lesson of S. 1080 lies in its providing for a congres-
91 S. 1080 provides that an agency proceeding on a major rule "shall include an oppor-
tunity for direct and cross-examination" of persons who have prepared data on which the
agency substantially relies, where "other procedures . . . are determined to be inadequate
for the resolution of significant issues of fact." Id. § 3, 128 CONG. REc. at S2713-14 (propos-
ing new 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)).
92 See id. § 3, 128 CONG. REC. at S2713 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(4)). Congress
should have been content with the bill's alternative requirement of republication of the no-
tice when the provisions of the final rule differ so substantially from the provisions of the
proposed rule that the original notice did not "fairly apprise the public of the issues ulti-
mately to be resolved." Id.
93 Notably, litigants have argued for years about whether particular fact findings should
be reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" or the "substantial evidence" standard,
although the standard's label does not make much difference. Associated Indus., Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d Cir. 1973); Active Judges and Pas-
sive Restraints, REaG., July-Aug. 1982, at 10, 11 (arguing that there is no difference between
"substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious," but noting that Congress intends the
former to be stricter).
94 S. 1080, supra note 3, § 5, 128 CONG. REc. at S2718 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. §
706(c)), would direct that a reviewing court require agency action to be "within the scope of
the agency jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the language of the statute or, in the
event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertainable legislative intent."
95 See supra note 94.
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sional veto of agency rules under various conditions." Without de-
bating the constitutionality or merits of such a provision, complex
questions themselves, 97 the veto provision illustrates how far Con-
gress is from a willingness to grapple with substantive reforms of
the type Breyer recommends. If the division of labor means any-
thing in legislation, Congress should be worrying first about the
broad design of regulatory statutes and last about whether, for ex-
ample, an FTC used-car rule is anathema to constituents."
CONCLUSION
Surveying nineteenth-century England, David Cecil reports
that in one parliamentary debate, "when an opponent had raised a
point against the Government, Althorp replied that he had some
facts with which he was sure he could answer it, but for the mo-
ment he had mislaid them. Both sides of the House at once ac-
cepted his answer as perfectly satisfactory."99 This charming confi-
dence is no longer with us, and reformers who propose or oppose
major legislative changes are expected to furnish reasons. Breyer's
very fine work will provide such reformers with many of the an-
swers they need.
Breyer deserves ample "points for difficulty" in taking on the
task of generalizing about administrative reform. It is easy enough
for a critic to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of a specific
program of regulation, usually after the fact. It is far harder, but
potentially far more useful, to frame precepts that sweep across
the regulatory landscape, as Breyer has done in Regulation and Its
Reform. If his arguments are not conclusive, they are certainly
persuasive.
Among those whom Breyer has persuaded are the distin-
guished members of a regulatory reform commission of the Ameri-
11 S. 1080, supra note 3, § 13, 128 CONG. REC. at S2719-21 (proposing new 5 U.S.C. §§
801-803).
" For discussions of these and related issues, see generally Bruff & Gellhorn, Congres-
sional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1369 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1119 (1977).
98 Congress vetoed the FTC's proposed rule that would have required dealers to dis-
close major defects in used cars and to state the extent of any outstanding warranties. Con-
gress Vetoes F.T.C. Rules On Disclosure of Car Defects, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982, at Al,
col. 1. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, held the
veto unconstitutional. Consumers Union of United States v. FTC, No. 82-1737, slip op. at 6
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1982) (en banc) (per curiam).
11 D. CECIL, MELBOURNE 235 (1966).
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can Bar Association."' Breyer's maxims were expressed earlier in
work he did for the commission, and the commission adopted all
three of the maxims 10' as its own.10 2 It is a rare academic proposal
that is subject to such scrutiny by so experienced a group; it is
rarer still for one to win so firm a measure of endorsement. 0 3
Helpful as the maxims may be as "first cut" presumptions, my
own view is that the book is even more useful because of the analy-
sis, collection of insights, review of alternative modes, and check-
lists of regulation's strengths and weaknesses that Breyer assem-
bles along the way in developing his maxims. Perhaps these
insights illuminate possibilities rather than probabilities, but they
can be sharp tools when wielded by a critic or reformer. Whether
or not Breyer's maxims are ever implemented through a proposal
like the Kennedy "high noon" legislation, they will remain valua-
ble in other contexts where the opportunities for reform may be
greater: in framing new regulatory measures, in opposing bad pro-
posals for unnecessary or excessive regulation based on narrow or
transient interests, and in the overhauling of legislation when a
crisis finally shows that existing regimes are unworkable.
Although the book emphasizes legislative reform, legislative
reformers are not the only ones who can apply the arguments of-
fered. Many regulatory statutes leave the regulators ample flex-
ibility to change the basic mode of regulation without resort to
Congress, at least where a reviewing court is sympathetic to the
new approach.10 4 The President, too, has the ability in many cases
to alter the thrust of regulatory programs, especially through deci-
sions on staffing and enforcement. This is, in sum, a book for all
branches.
100 This was the ABA Commission on Law and the Economy. The Commission had at
different times over 30 members, including former Secretary of Transportation William
Coleman, Washington lawyer and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Judge Henry
Friendly, whose opinions and articles on the administrative process are classics, a number of
individuals with extensive regulatory experience (including former Commissioners Thrower
(IRS), Wheat (SEC), and Wiley (FCC)), and several distinguished economists (MacAvoy,
Meyer, Sommers, and Wallace).
101 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
102 ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 32, at 24-67.
103 There was only one express dissent to the recommendation embodying Breyer's
maxims. Id. at 144.
104 A dramatic example of such a change was the FCC's decision to convert long-dis-
tance specialized telephone service from a public utility monopoly administered largely by
the Bell System to one of virtually unlimited entry for specialized carriers. Specialized Com-
mon Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870, reconsid. denied, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), aff'd sub
nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 836 (1975).
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In the end, however one may view Breyer's maxims, it is no
small help to be reminded by them that the regulatory problem
may not lie in the fine tuning of the regime, better information,
prohibitions on "revolving door" personnel and ex parte contacts,
or any of the usual paraphernalia of reform proposals. Instead, the
regime may be founded on a basic misapprehension about the right
regulatory medicine to treat the disease. As William James once
wrote in an anonymous editorial for a reforming magazine,
"[h]owever skeptical one may be of the attainment of universal
truths . . . one can never deny that philosophic study means the
habit of always seeing an alternative, of not taking the usual for
granted, of making conventionalities fluid again, of imagining for-
eign states of mind.' 10 5 By adopting this outlook, Breyer has ad-
vanced the prospects for real regulatory reform.
105 23 NATION 178 (1876), reprinted in 1 THE L~rmiRs OF WILLIAM JAMES 190 (H. James
ed. 1920).
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